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The power grid defines one of the most important technological networks of our times and sustains our
complex society. It has evolved for more than a century into an extremely huge and seemingly robust and well
understood system. But it becomes extremely fragile as well, when unexpected, usually minimal, failures turn
into unknown dynamical behaviours leading, for example, to sudden and massive blackouts. Here we explore
the fragility of the European power grid under the effect of selective node removal. A mean field analysis of
fragility against attacks is presented together with the observed patterns. Deviations from the theoretical
conditions for network percolation and fragmentation under attacks are analysed and correlated with non
topological reliability measures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The power grid defines, together with transportation net-
works and the Internet, the most important class of human-
based web. It allows the success of advanced economies
based on electrical power but it also illustrates the limitations
imposed by environmental concerns, together with economic
and demographic growth: The power grid reaches its limits
with an ever growing demand 1. A direct consequence of
this situation is the fragility of this energy infrastructure, as
manifested in terms of sudden blackouts and large scale cas-
cading failures, mostly caused by localized, small scale fail-
ures, ocurring at an increasing frequency 2,3.
The fragility of the power grid is an example of a gener-
alized feature of most complex networks, from the Internet
to the genome 4–8. Specifically, real networks are often
characterized by a considerable resilience against random re-
moval or failure of individual units but experience important
shortcomings when the highly connected elements are the
target of the removal. Such directed attacks have dramatic
structural effects, typically leading to network fragmentation
9–12. This behavior has been studied for skewed power-
law distributions of links, which are found in many small-
world networks 13,14. But recent studies have shown that
similar responses are not unique to small-world, scale-free
networks: Power grids, having less skewed exponential de-
gree distributions and often without small-world topology,
display similar patterns of response to node loss 15.
An additional feature of the power grid is its spatial struc-
ture. The geographic character of this network implies that a
number of constraints are expected to be at work. Other well
known spatially extended nets include the Internet 16,
street networks 17, railroad and subway networks 18, ant
galleries 19, electric circuits 20, or cortical graphs 21.
One fundamental aspect concerning the analysis of com-
plex networks is the increasing evidence of mutual influence
between dynamical behavior and topological structure. The
topology of human contact networks, for example, deter-
mines the emergence of epidemics 22; similarly, the correct
dynamics in cellular networks are rooted in the topology of
the regulatory networks 23,24. Here we present evidence of
a plausible relation between topological and nontopological
reliability measures for the power grid, suggesting that topol-
ogy might be capturing the robustness or fragility of the
real system, when dynamics are at work. This evidence has
been obtained analyzing the resilience of 33 different power
grids: a The 23 different EU countries, b four geographi-
cally related zones Iberian Peninsula, Ireland as island, En-
gland as island, and United Kingdom and Ireland as a
whole, c four traditionally united or separated regions
former Yugoslavia, Czechoslovaquia and Federal and
Democratic Republics of Germany, d continental Europe,
and e continental Europe plus United Kingdom and Ireland.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II the data set
on European power grids is presented and their basic topo-
logical features summarized. In Sec. III we present both ana-
lytical and numerical estimations of the boundaries for net-
work collapse under attack, using a mean field theoretical
approach. Two classes of networks are shown to be present.
In Sec. IV, evidence for correlation between these two
classes and nontopological reliability indexes is shown to
exist. In Sec. V we summarize our findings and outline their
implications.
II. POWER GRID DATA SETS
Europe’s electricity transport network is nowadays the en-
semble of more than twenty different national power grids
coordinated, at its higher level, by the Union for the Co-
ordination of Transmission Electricity, UCTE http://
www.ucte.org. The distribution and location of transmission
lines, plants, stations, etc., can be found in the last version
July 2007 of the UCTE Map. The different data sets ana-
lyzed here have been obtained after introducing the topologi-
cal values i.e. geographical positions and longitudes of
more than 3000 generators and substations nodes and
200 000 km of transmission lines edges in a geographical
information system GIS. The national power grid for every
country or region has been obtained from a typical GIS
query: the selection of the part of the UCTE’s network con-
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strained by every country’s frontier. The power grid can then
be formally described in terms of a graph = V ,E. Here
V= vi indicates the set of N nodes transformers, substa-
tions or generators in our context. Figure 1 shows an ex-
ample of such graphs with its geographical a and topologi-
cal b structures, respectively. These nodes can be
connected, and E= eij indicates the set of actual links be-
tween pairs of nodes. Specifically, eij = vi ,v j indicates that
energy is being transported between the nodes in the pair
vi ,v j. Our system can be analyzed at two main levels: The
whole power grid EU including all countries within the EU
and at the country level. If k indicates the kth power grid of
one of the n=33 countries and regions involved, we have
EU=k=1
n k.
The global organization of these webs has been previ-
ously analyzed 15, revealing a very interesting set of com-
mon regularities: a Most of them are small worlds i.e.,
very short path lengths are typically present and the larger
webs display clustering coefficients much larger than ex-
pected from a random version of the network analysed; b
they are very sparse, with an average of k=2.8 over all the
webs available see Table I; c the link distribution is ex-
ponential: The probability of having a node linked to k other
nodes is Pk=exp−k / / Fig. 1c; and d these net-
works are weakly or not correlated. This exponential distri-
bution is thus characterized by the constant  which actually
corresponds to the average degree i.e., k=.
Correlations were measured using the average nearest
neighbor connectivity of a node with the degree k, i.e., the
average knn=	kkPk 
k where Pk 
k is the conditional
probability that a link belonging to a node with connectivity
k points to a node with connectivity k 25. For these webs,
it was found that knnconst, as expected if no correlations
were present. This is a very useful property in our analysis,
since makes mean field predictions valid in spite that we
ignore the planar character of these networks, thus replacing
the geographical pattern by a topological one. Nonetheless,
as these webs are geographically embedded, some care needs
to be taken see 27 in connection with epidemic spreading.
III. ATTACKS IN EXPONENTIAL NETWORKS:
MEAN FIELD THEORY
In our previous paper, we analyzed the effects of both
random and selective removal of nodes on the EU grids 15.
Nonetheless, in that paper we were mostly interested in the
average behavior of the networks analyzed see Fig. 2. Here
we want to extend these results to the analysis of the differ-
ences observed in EU power grids with the goal of interpret-
ing the different patterns exhibited compared to the predic-
tions from mean field theory on intentional attacks.
In order to compute the effect of random removal of
nodes, we compute the percolation condition for the graph
assuming it is sparse and uncorrelated. Let f be the fraction
of removed nodes and Pk the link degree distribution of
our graph. The damaged graph will be characterized by the
following degree distribution Pk 28:
Pk = 	
ik
  ik  f i−k1 − fkPk . 1
Note that such an equation corresponds to the case when a
fraction f of nodes are removed but it also holds when a
fraction f of links are removed or lead to unoccupied sites.
In order to study percolation properties, we use the stan-
dard generating function methodology. The two first gener-
ating functions of the damaged graph are
F0x = 	
k

Pk1 − fxk, 2
F1x =
1
k	k

kPk1 − fxk−1. 3
The averages i.e., the values at x=1 are F01=F11=1
− f , respectively. Here F01 is the fraction of nodes from the
original graph belonging to the damaged graph. Similarly,
F11 is the relation among k and the average number of
nodes from V that can be reached after deleting a fraction f
of nodes. The generating function for the size of the compo-
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FIG. 1. Power grids define a spatial, typically planar graph with nodes including generators, transformers, and substations. Here we show
a the geographical and b the topological organization of the Italian power grid. These webs are homogeneous, having an exponential
degree distribution, Pk=exp−k / /, as shown in c.
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nents, other than the giant one, which can be reached from a
randomly choosen node is
H1x = f + xF1H1x 4
and the generating function for the size of the component to
which a randomly choosen node belongs to is 26
H0x = f + xF0H1x . 5
Thus the average component size, other than the giant com-
ponent, will be
s = H01 = 1 − f + F01 H11 . 6
After some algebra, we see that this leads to a singularity
when F11=1. To ensure the percolation of the damaged
graph, the following inequality has to hold:
	
k
kk − 2Pk	
k
kk − 1fPk . 7
The above expression can be expressed as
k2 − 2k fk2 − k 8
which leads to a critical probability of node removal fc given
by
TABLE I. A summary of the basic features exhibited by some of the European power grids analyzed, ordered by increasing , the
exponential degree distribution exponent. The critical probability of node removal fc is shown for both cases, theoretical and real, and
random errors and selective attacks removal of nodes. The absolute difference 
	fc
 between theoretical and observed critical probability
diminishes as  increases in general terms. Number of nodes N, number of links L, and mean degree k are also shown as reference.
Countries in italics have been used to evaluate reliability indexes. EU results i.e., results for the EU graph are shown for comparative
purposes.
Country 
Errors Attacks
N L kfctheor fcreal 
	fc
 fctheor fcreal 
	fc

Belgium 1,005 0,011 0,395 0,384 0,010 0,131 0,121 53 58 2,18
Holland 1,086 0,147 0,387 0,240 0,034 0,126 0,092 36 38 2,11
Germany 1,237 0,322 0,565 0,243 0,097 0,229 0,132 445 560 2,51
Italy 1,238 0,322 0,583 0,261 0,097 0,241 0,144 272 368 2,70
Austria 1,409 0,450 0,506 0,056 0,159 0,191 0,032 70 77 2,20
Rumania 1,418 0,455 0,579 0,124 0,162 0,238 0,076 106 132 2,49
Greece 1,457 0,477 0,492 0,015 0,174 0,183 0,009 27 33 2,44
Croatia 1,594 0,543 0,525 0,018 0,214 0,202 0,012 34 38 2,23
Portugal 1,606 0,548 0,595 0,047 0,217 0,250 0,033 56 72 2,57
EU 1,630 0,557 0,629 0,072 0,223 0,275 0,052 2783 3762 2,70
Poland 1,641 0,562 0,594 0,033 0,226 0,249 0,023 163 212 2,60
Slovakia 1,660 0,569 0,563 0,006 0,231 0,227 0,004 43 52 2,41
Bulgaria 1,763 0,604 0,570 0,034 0,256 0,232 0,024 56 67 2,39
Switzerland 1,850 0,629 0,610 0,020 0,275 0,260 0,015 147 186 2,53
Czech Republic 1,883 0,638 0,634 0,004 0,281 0,279 0,003 70 88 2,51
France 1,895 0,641 0,647 0,006 0,285 0,289 0,004 667 899 2,69
Hungary 1,946 0,654 0,617 0,036 0,295 0,266 0,029 40 47 2,35
Bosnia 1,952 0,655 0,588 0,067 0,295 0,244 0,052 36 42 2,33
Spain 2,008 0,668 0,689 0,020 0,307 0,324 0,017 474 669 2,82
Serbia 2,199 0,705 0,655 0,051 0,339 0,296 0,054 65 81 2,49
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FIG. 2. Effects of attacks and failures on the topology of the EU
power grids. Static tolerance to random white circles and selective
black circles removal of a fraction f of nodes, measured by the
relative size Sinf of the largest connected component. Whiskers
stand for the standard deviation. Inset: Evolution of the static toler-
ance to random and selective node removal for Italy dashed lines
and France continous lines. Though in the case of random removal
failures both networks exhibit a similar response, for the selective
one attacks, Italy behaves in a slightly stronger manner i.e., for a
fixed fraction of eliminated nodes, the relative size of the largest
connected component in Italy always remains higher than that of
France.
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fc = 1 −
1

0 − 1
, 9
where 
0= k2 / k, and in agreement with 28. In our case,
we have an analytic estimate 
0=2. Using the average
value =1.9, we obtain a predicted critical probability fc
=0.61.
Although random removal is an interesting scenario, it
considers chance events that are not correlated to network
structure. Intentional attacks strongly deviate from random
failures: Even a small fraction of removed nodes having
large degrees has dramatic consequences. In order to predict
the effects of such directed attacks on network structure, the
critical probability associated to network breakdown can be
computed. Here we follow the formalism developed by Co-
hen et al. 29. Roughly speaking, this formalism enables us
to translate an intentional attack into an equivalent random
failure and study the problem in terms of standard percola-
tion using Eq. 9. When the selective removal of the most
connected nodes is considered, a fraction of order O1 /N is
removed by eliminating elements with a degree larger than a
given k=K. This upper cutoff is then easily computed from
the continuous approximation:
	
K

Pk  
K
 1

e−k/dk =
1
N
10
and the new cutoff K˜ can be obtained again under a con-
tinuous approximation from

K
K˜ 1

e−k/dk = 
K
 1

e−k/dk −
1
N
= p , 11
which gives assuming K large enough a new cutoff
K˜ = −  ln p . 12
Following 29, we translate the problem of intentional
attack to an equivalent random failure problem. The removal
of a fraction f of nodes with the highest degree is then
equivalent to the random removal of those links connecting
the remaining nodes to those already removed. Thus, the
probability that a specific link leads to a deleted node will be
given by
p˜ = 
K
K˜ kPk
k
dk , 13
k being the average degree of the undamaged graph. It is
not difficult to show that this gives
p˜ = K˜

+ 1e−K˜ /. 14
Using Eq. 12 it is straightforward to see that
p˜ = ln pc − 1pc, 15
where we assume that K is large enough to ignore the term
exp−K /. Thus an equivalent network with maximal de-
gree K˜ has been built after a random removal of p˜ nodes due
to the fact that the absence of correlations implies a random
failure of links. In order to obtain the degree distribution of
the damaged graph, such a failure can be introduced into Eq.
3. But this will be formally equivalent to the removal of p˜
nodes. Thus, to study stability properties, we only need the
resulting probability p˜ to be introduced in the critical condi-
tion for percolation 9. Replacing pc= p˜, we obtain
1 + ln pc − 1pc =
1
2 − 1
, 16
whose solutions for each fixed  provide the conditions for
network percolation under attacks. In Fig. 3 and Table I, we
show the result of our calculations. As expected, a much
lower value of fc is required to break a power grid network
through intentional attack.
Now we can compare this mean field prediction, evalu-
ated as fctheor, with available data. Using the whole dataset of
EU grids, we can estimate fcreal for all EU countries. The
result are shown, for both fc’s, in Fig. 3b. As we can see,
there is a very good agreement given their small size be-
tween observed real and predicted theoretical fc values,
but some nontrivial deviations are also obvious. We can see
that aproximately for 1.5 the expected fc values are very
similar to those predicted by theory. However, the power
grids having lower exponents when 1.5 strongly devi-
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FIG. 3. a Phase space for exponential uncorrelated networks
under random removal of nodes and directed attack towards highly
connected vertices. Here  is the average degree of the exponential
network and fc indicates the fraction of removed nodes required in
order to break the network into many pieces. The upper curve is the
critical boundary for network percolation under random removal of
nodes. Below it, a network experiencing such random failures
would remain connected i.e., with a giant component. The lower
curve corresponds to the critical boundary for attacks. In b we
display the estimated values of fc for attacks from the thirty-
three EU power grids circles to be compared with the mean field
prediction continuous line.
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ate from the predicted values. These agreements and devia-
tions are not due to some simple statistical trait, such as
network size. As indicated in Table I, very large power grids
are in both sides i.e., the German and Italian grids are in the
first group, whereas the Spanish and French ones belong to
the second and mixed with smaller ones. Although the effect
of geography on the properties of some networks is impor-
tant see 27,30 for example, this last observation would
suggest that the geographical embedding of these networks
might have a small effect.
IV. CORRELATIONS WITH NONTOPOLOGICAL
RELIABILITY MEASURES
The reliability of a power grid evaluates its ability to con-
tinuously meet demand under major events like overloads,
general failures, external impacts and alike. At the engineer-
ing level, and due to the different dimensions of service qual-
ity involved in a power grid i.e., consumers, companies, and
regulators, reliability has been traditionally measured by
different indexes as a the amount of energy not supplied,
b the total loss of power, or c the equivalent time of
interruption, which measures the number and duration of in-
terruptions experienced by customers 31. In this sense we
would expect a correlation between the critical percolation
fraction fc, the exponent that characterizes the grids’ cumu-
lative degree distribution , and some of if not all these
reliability indexes presented.
In order to explore the problem, three reliability indexes
have been obtained from the UCTE monthly reliability mea-
sures 32. They are related to four major events. Namely,
overloads, general failures, external impacts and exceptional
conditions, and finally other reasons including unknown
reasons. For every major event and transmission grid, the
following indexes have been considered and normalized: 1
Energy not supplied, normalized by the gross UCTE electric-
ity consumption; 2 total loss of power, normalized by the
UCTE peak load on the third Wednesday of December; and
3 equivalent time of interruption also known as average
interruption time or AIT, which is the ratio between the total
energy not supplied and the average power demand per year,
measured in minutes per year normalized by definition.
In order to avoid statistical deviations due to the limited
historical data available UCTE monthly statistics have been
published only from January 2002 onwards, we have dev-
ided UCTE networks in two groups. Group 1 includes those
countries whose critical breakdown probability fcreal agrees
with that predicted fctheor i.e., countries with 1.5. Group
2 includes those countries whose fcreal deviates positively
from fctheor i.e., countries with 1.5, with an expected
more robust topology than that predicted.
Figure 4 gives the acummulated percentage values for the
formerly presented reliability indexes and for each group of
networks. As we can see, networks in group 1 i.e., networks
with fcreal fctheor represent 63% of the whole UCTE nodes,
they manage 48 and 51% of the UCTE energy and power,
respectively, but acummulate 85, 68, and 79% of the UCTE
average interruption time, power loss and energy not deliv-
ered, respectively. On the contrary, though networks in group
2 i.e., networks with fcreal fctheor represent a mere 33% of
the whole UCTE nodes, they manage 46 and 44% of the
UCTE energy and power respectively similar to those of
group 1 but, even so, they acummulate only 15, 32, and
21% of the UCTE average interruption time, power loss and
energy not delivered, respectively. This fact would suggest a
positive correlation between static topological robustness
and nontopological reliability measures and, as a conse-
quence, a clear diferentiation between two classes of net-
works in terms of their level of robustness.
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have extended our previous work on the
robustness of the European power grid under random failures
with the intentional attacks scenario. A mean field theory
approach has been used in order to analytically predict the
fragility of the networks against selective removal of nodes
and a significant deviation from predicted values has been
found for power grids with an exponent 1.5. For these
networks, the real critical fraction fcreal is higher than the
theoretical one fctheor for the same . This suggests an in-
creased robustness for these networks compared to those
with 1.5.
In order to evaluate the real existence of this two classes
of networks, namely robust and fragile, real reliability mea-
sures from the Union for the Co-Ordination of Transport of
Electricity UCTE have been used. It has been found that
there seems to exist indeed a positive correlation between
static topological robustness measures and real nontopologi-
cal reliability measures. This correlation shows that networks
in the robust class i.e., networks with fcreal fctheor, though
representing only 33% of the UCTE nodes under study and
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FIG. 4. Power grid indexes vs reliability indexes. a Networks
in group 1 i.e., 1.5 and fc fc,p, though representing two-
thirds of the UCTE size, share almost as much power and energy as
networks in group 2 i.e., 1.5 and fc fc,p. b Nonetheless,
these same networks of group 1 acummulate more than five times
the average interruption time AIT of the latter, more than two
times their power losses, and almost four times their undelivered
energy.
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managing a similar amount of power and energy than that of
the networks in the fragile class, acummulate much less per-
centage of the whole UCTE average interruption time, power
loss, and energy not delivered. Due to the limited historical
reliability data available, it is actually not possible to detect
whether a network is more robust the higher fcreal is, or sim-
ply due to the fact that fcreal fctheor. How this can be related
with the internal topological structure of the networks and
the subgraphs abundances is actually a main point under
study and will be explored elsewhere.
This feature is of obvious importance. Up to this date and
as far as we know, no such correlation between topological
and dynamical features has been encountered in any study
related to complex networks structure and dynamics. From
the power industry point of view, constantly facing the chal-
lenge of meeting growing demands with security of supply at
the lowest possible spenditure in infrastructures, the implica-
tions of this feature would permit new rather than traditional
approaches to contingency-based planning criteria 33. One
of these traditional, and widely used, planning criteria is the
so-called N−X criterion. It assumes that no interruption of
service can occur in a system with N units of equipment due
to isolation of X outaged components. Without any topologi-
cal feedback, the N−X methodology a requires fast
breaker operation to open any circuit pathway that has been
faulted as well as to close the alternate path to service and b
pushes the system to an increasing interconnection complex-
ity as its utilization ratio i.e., ratio between peak load and
capacity of subtransmission lines and substation transform-
ers increases in time aging infrastructures. Though aging
infrastructures, excessive power delivered through increasing
long distances and other possible causes may influence the
increasing fragility of the power grids, it seems reasonable
to think that, on a topological basis, the application of the
N−X contingency-based criteria, though originally in-
tended to avoid interruptions in power service, would diffi-
cult, at the same time, the islanding of disturbances i.e., the
more connected an element is, the easier would be for a
disturbance to reach. In other words, the same criteria that
successfully has served to increase reliability in power sys-
tems through the late 20th century might now be responsible
for the difficulties encountered in preventing perturbations,
blackouts or isolating the different power grid elements.
Over the past years, and mainly due to economic impera-
tives, contingency-based planning criteria has been gradually
pervaded by reliability-based planning criteria. In the latter,
the prevention of likely contingencies of severe impact is
considered much more effective than that of low probability
and low impact. Nonetheless, this fact leaves the main con-
ception of N−X criteria still valid and at work in most of
the ongoing grid’s planning processes. Following the former
discussion, we would suggest adding a third topology-based
planning methodology, in order to take this fact into account.
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